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Introduction 
By developing what I call the logic of the mask, I aim to show the import 
of appearance—of the shallow—to Nietzsche’s thinking. A paradigm of truth 
which locates it in the metaphysical realm far beyond the sensible world renders 
the shallow as that which is merely opposed to the deep. On this paradigm, depth 
is effectively correlated with the meaningful and surface with the meaningless. 
Philosophical aesthetics, which has appearance as its sole point of investigation, 
has elided meaningful discussions of fashion and dress with few exceptions. The 
rejection of dress as a “superficial” topic is predicated on a dualism between 
shallow and profound linking depth with meaning, and surface with inessentiality. 
My aim in this paper is to suggest that Nietzsche’s rejection of the appearance-
reality distinction (and with it, a metaphysical conception of truth) subsequently 
results in an affirmation of appearances which itself reorients philosophical 
attention to the “shallow.” In their respective works on Nietzsche, Lou Andreas-
Salomé and Gilles Deleuze both highlight the significance of the mask and its 
relationship to Nietzsche’s thinking; I use Salomé and Deleuze to develop this 
interpretation.  
 
Nietzsche’s Masks  
Nietzsche’s claim in the Genealogy of Morality that “philosophy would have 
been absolutely impossible for most of the time on earth without an ascetic mask 
and a suit of clothes” emphasizes the significance of theological metaphysics in 
sustaining the history of Western philosophy. Asceticism for Nietzsche comes to 
signify the maintenance of a harmful metaphysical dualism between this world 
and another: a dualism which ascetic morality comes to forcefully maintain. What 
the comment indicates then is a conception of the mask, and of dress more 
broadly by extension, as “mere” appearance, where “mere” indicates the existence 
of a deeper, more “truthful” self. Nietzsche’s critique of asceticism would take 
me beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice it to say here that his critique 
inculcates philosophy’s obsession with metaphysical depth and with interiority. 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God in The Gay Science is perhaps the 
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most well-known example of Nietzsche’s critique of origins, and is exemplary of 
his rejection of a depth conception of truth: that rejection of a metaphysically 
“true” world undergirding the world of appearances. This hermeneutics of 
suspicion certainly implicates a theological metaphysics as the culprit for an 
enduring, trans-historical conception of truth.  
      To say that philosophy itself would have been impossible without a suit of 
clothes suggests to me that philosophy as a practice is and has been enabled by 
two beliefs: first, the distinction between appearance and reality, and second, the 
existence of truth as residing beyond the world of “mere” appearances, which is 
to say, as a robustly metaphysical conception of truth. This denigration of 
appearances—and with it, the world and the fleshly—is what leads both to 
asceticism as a value, and to Nietzsche’s eventual critique of asceticism as a value. 
Nietzsche’s critique of asceticism is the foundation for his later philosophy of 
self-overcoming; the critique of metaphysical loyalty to depth as both origin and 
value is imperative to the cultivation of self-creating, or, said otherwise, to self-
fashioning. The implication here is that the affirmation of the world of 
appearances is the pivotal moment of Nietzsche’s positive philosophy. If 
asceticism for Nietzsche is the height of passive nihilism, then his critique of 
asceticism and subsequent affirmation of the earthly world of appearances would 
seem to render the world, at the least, a source and site of nihilism’s overcoming. 
Ironic, since clothing and dress are at least in a colloquial sense considered to be 
rather meaningless or empty objects.  Undergirding the ascetic on Nietzsche’s 
critique is the appearance-reality distinction upheld by theological metaphysics. 
The undermining of this distinction, then, is crucial to Nietzsche’s project of the 
revaluation of values. 
      In The Gay Science, Nietzsche writes that “mystical explanations are considered 
deep; the truth is, they are not even shallow” (121). Walter Kaufmann suggests 
that this distinction between the shallow and the profound is meant to indicate 
two ways of reading his work. This means that the shallow becomes associated 
with “appearance” (with every day, common, shared reality, and the profound 
with the “masked truth...accessible only to higher men).”1 This reading of the 
appearance-reality distinction, as David H. Fisher points out, is incongruent with 
Nietzsche’s own critique of the distinction throughout his work. If we are to make 
sense of Nietzsche’s comment in Beyond Good and Evil that “everything profound 
loves masks,” then we must make sense of it alongside, and not in spite of, his 
rejection of the two truth theory, i.e., the distinction between appearance and 
reality. David Fisher suggests that, since Nietzsche had rejected the theory by the 																																																								
1 This is how David H. Fisher puts it in “Nietzsche’s Dionysian Masks.” 
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time he wrote Beyond Good and Evil, “the words must be taken ironically rather 
than literally” (522).   
      Nietzsche’s use of masks in Zarathustra is usually thought to indicate the 
tension brought about by Nietzsche’s own preface to the text: that Zarathustra is 
meant both for the all and the none.2 That would mean that the mask is what 
allows for a kind of ironic distance when addressing an “audience suffering from 
failed desire,” to borrow Adrian Del Caro & Robert Pippin’s term (Caro & Pippin, 
xx). On this interpretation, the mask is both a tool of performance and an 
instrument for teaching the lessons of Zarathustra. With intended irony, I call this 
a shallow interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of the language and imagery of masks 
and masking. I realize that it might be rather odd that The Birth of Tragedy makes 
no cameo in this discussion of Nietzsche’s masks. After all, Dionysus is the masked 
god to whom Nietzsche claims he is a disciple. Given the very literal, theatrical 
associations of and with masking, especially as related to the figure of Dionysus, 
it is no surprise that the literature that has developed on Nietzsche’s “masks” 
tends to read the imagery along these lines. But the proliferation of “masks” in 
the later works indicates that a more complex account of masking is needed in 
addition to the line of interpretation which aligns masks with theatrical masking. 
Caro & Pippin’s interpretation is an extension of this analysis of the mask from 
The Birth of Tragedy to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
      The textual evidence in Thus Spoke Zarathustra calls for a more nuanced 
interpretation of masks as other than a mere metaphor for a disguised or “hidden” 
self. In “On the Land of Education” Nietzsche says that the person of today 
“couldn’t wear a better mask … than that of your own face! Who could recognize 
you? Written full with the characters of the past, and even these characters painted 
over with new characters: thus you have hidden yourselves well from all 
interpreters of characters!” (93). He later claims that the religious don “God’s 
mask,” into which a “horrid worm has crawled” (97). Even Zarathustra at times 
seems to be “like a beautiful mask of a saint … like a new wondrous masquerade 
in which my evil spirit, the melancholy devil, enjoys himself” (241).  The old 
magician sings: “Are your longings beneath a thousand masks/ You fool! You 
Poet!” (244). To say that the face is a mask is not to say that the visage is a mask 
of a true self which can only be found in psychological interiority, but to instead 
suggest an ontology of the mask. There is no true essence of a self underneath 
the mask of the face, but only another mask, and another under that, and so on. 
Since ontology is genealogical for Nietzsche—that is, there is no history of 																																																								
2 Both Adrian Del Caro & Robert Pippin’s in their introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (2006), 
and Stanley Rosen in The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (1995) make these claims. 
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ontology without a genealogy—Zarathustra is intimating the genealogical, even 
geological nature of the self: a self which grows out of and through present 
systems of values and virtues, continuing a process of masking as a kind of 
sedimentation.  
      The masks of “everyday” people are made with paint, and mirrors placed 
around the figures reflect their painted, masked images back onto themselves. 
This indicates both a mass-scale projection and reflection of their own ideals, 
understood to be that of the ascetic or of ascetic morality more broadly. The 
characters of the past are “painted over” with new characters, and so on, and so 
forth; people are “baked” from the colors of these paints. And yet, Zarathustra 
pronounces, “all ages and peoples speak from your veils; motley, all customs and 
beliefs speak from your gestures “(93). To briefly preempt the next section on 
Deleuze, being is its own history of contingent “forms,” which can and indeed 
do change through time. Referring to the “paint” passage quoted above, Luce 
Irigaray writes “I have washed off your masks and make up, scrubbed away your 
multicolored projections and designs...” (Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche, 4). But 
for Nietzsche, “appearance is a form of being” (KSA 13:14 [93]). The masks don’t 
indicate a veneer, but instead point to the particular form of morality prevalent at 
the time. In the next section, I’ll say more about how the mask operates as a form.  
 
Salomé & Deleuze  
For Lou Andreas-Salomé and Gilles Deleuze most explicitly, the mask is 
conceptually central to Nietzsche’s philosophy: and even more so to 
understanding Nietzsche. In his introduction to Salomé’s book, Siegfried Mandel 
writes that Nietzsche practiced what he called “dissimulation” [Verstellung] in an 
ironic adoption of masks, much as an actor uses them on stage in order to enjoy 
the pleasure particular to this form of artistic deception. He suggests that 
Nietzsche was stimulated by the tension created by the dual activity (which is to 
say, the activity of deception) and eventually craved and willed that tension as a 
necessary condition for his creativity (Nietzsche, xviii). Mandel’s suggestion here is 
that the mask produces the tension between realities: between immanent and 
transcendent, this world and another world, etc. I don’t disagree: in fact, it’s the 
production of these dualisms that constitutes, in part, the mask’s very logic. I 
would however extend the claim and suggest that the mask operates more as a 
form of productive emptiness rather than as that revelation of interiority 
(understood here as the mere inverse of exteriority). Mandel’s overarching belief 
here, that the mask merely “covers” and therefore allows for the play between 
inside and outside, self and other, etc., is similar to Adrian del Caro, Robert 
THE AGONIST 
26	
Pippin, and Stanley Rosen’s claims that the mask functions more as a metaphor 
than as a rich concept—or even, as I’m suggesting here, as an operative logic. 
      In Salomé’s psychological-biographical monograph on Nietzsche, she 
suggests that his descent into “madness” was actually something like the logical 
conclusion of his own philosophy: that his thinking, and his person, were not 
separable. She says that “The more his [Nietzsche’s] teachings seem to be 
generalized, the more they gain greater specific meanings as to his personal 
character … Ultimately, the last secrets of his texts are hidden under so many 
masks that the theories he expresses emerge almost only through images from his 
inner life. Absent finally is any desire to reconcile one with the other…” (87). She 
draws on Zarathustra, where Nietzsche asks: “what is there except my self (sic)? 
There is no externality!” (Z:3 “The Convalescent”). By the time Salomé wrote this 
text, she was already well immersed in psychoanalysis and was establishing a 
formative relationship with Freud. This psychoanalytic alliance creates a 
philosophical tension between Nietzsche and Freud: where the former rejects the 
affirmation of a depth conception of truth, the latter affirms the existence of the 
reality of an “inner” life. In my view, Salomé’s work is a clear attempt to reconcile 
these two positions within herself, but it seems that she upholds and maintains 
Nietzsche’s critique of the appearance-reality distinction. The self “is no 
externality,” as Nietzsche himself claims, but neither is it an “interiority” to be 
found underneath a mask.   
      Salomé accepts Nietzsche’s critique of origins, and with it his rejection of 
truth as metaphysical depth which a metaphysics of origination necessarily entails. 
For Nietzsche, Salomé says, “everything which is objective reality becomes 
appearance—only a deceptive veil which the isolated depth weaves about itself in 
order to become a temporary surface intelligible to human eyes” (11). What 
appears, then, is the most real, and not merely its cover or shawl. To say that 
reality becomes appearance is to say that reality is nothing other than the changing 
sensibilities of appearance. This notion of reality as becoming, then, replaces a 
theological metaphysics with a process metaphysics highlighting the mutable 
forms of the sensible world.  
      The critique of metaphysics is related to what Salomé locates as the paradox 
of asceticism in Nietzsche. She says that: “On the one hand Nietzsche fights 
common morality because of its ascetic character and its denigration and 
condemnation of the animality which Nietzsche values so highly as a source of 
strength; on the other hand, he fights the reigning morality because it is 
insufficiently ascetic” (117). Nietzsche’s philosophy is of course rife with what we 
might charitably call productive paradoxes. Nietzsche is critical, of course, of 
conventional morality, where it suffices for human beings to resemble a projected 
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image of the ideal. For Salomé, this results in an aesthetic veneer, but not a 
thoroughgoing change: the person would “sink to the level of an actor who 
merely dramatizes his own ideal” (think of the function of the mirrors in the 
passage quoted in the previous section) (120). Another productive paradox here 
is that the key to the overthrowing or critique of conventional morality rests 
dormant within it: namely, that human beings have first gained a capacity for 
superiority through their development within a reigning morality, art, and religion. 
This view is what permitted Nietzsche to believe in the possibility of a change in 
man’s “essence”; one’s “‘essence” transforms through one’s relationship to 
morality, art, and religion. Daniel Anderson says that “Dionysos was god of 
masks. But as god of masks his essence is to be masked; there can be no Dionysos 
unmasked” (The Masks of Dionysos, 8). Though Anderson is talking specifically 
about Dionysos in the Platonic context, the suggestion is applicable: this 
conception of masking as essence challenges any conception of masking which 
would merely uphold the dualisms between interiority and exteriority, and 
between appearance and reality. As an object, a mask does not mask on its own. 
However, a mask remains what it is despite its not having anything to “mask.” 
Masks, then, cover nothing, while simultaneously always in the act of revealing 
itself. Can a mask be masked? It cannot, for a mask is always what covers.  
      Of Nietzsche’s philosophy, Salomé says that “ethics unobtrusively merges 
with aesthetics” (121). The moral is no longer relegated to the realm of 
metaphysical intelligibility, but becomes indistinguishable from aesthetic 
sensibility. This is the key of Salomé’s insight. The depth conception of truth 
implied by Nietzsche’s critique of theological metaphysics implicates ethics in the 
form of ascetic morality. Instead, a philosophy of ‘self-fashioning’ is favored in 
the affirmation of the earthly world of appearances. Nietzsche’s critique of 
metaphysics is itself predicated on the harmful dualism between this world and 
another, which itself produces ascetic morality. This means that Nietzsche’s own 
positive thinking relies not on a mere reversal of the dualism (i.e. a taste for this 
world over another), but on its very annihilation. The mask operates as this 
junction—this Spielraum, this pivot—upon which the inside and the outside are 
demarcated.  
      Deleuze takes the opposition between health and sickness as a fulcrum for 
thinking about masks and masking in Nietzsche’s philosophy. He writes that the 
crux of Nietzsche’s method is the reversal or shift afforded by illness as a means 
to evaluate health, and health as a means to evaluate illness. Deleuze claims that 
there is not a reciprocity between the two, and that the very possibility for a 
change in perspective afforded by the dualism is what ultimately situates health as 
ultimate victor. This “art of displacement,” as Deleuze calls it, becomes lost when 
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Nietzsche “could no longer in his health make of sickness a point of view on 
health” (59). Later, when Deleuze then says that madness is not Nietzsche’s 
mask—contra to Nietzsche’s own claim—he means that madness is itself no 
longer a pivot point, no longer a perspective from which evaluation can occur. I 
read this not as a rejection of the mask as a functional logic, but as an affirmation. 
Contrary to the suggestion that Nietzsche’s madness was his “final mask,” i.e., 
the fateful mask which covered over his genius, Deleuze seems to be suggesting 
that Nietzsche’s madness is not a “mask” which covers anything at all. At the 
same time, he tells us that “With Nietzsche, everything is a mask. His health was 
a first mask for his genius; his suffering, a second mask, both for his genius and 
for his health. Nietzsche didn’t believe in the unity of a self and didn’t experience 
it.” (Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 59). Deleuze challenges Nietzsche’s own claim that 
“madness itself is the mask that hides a knowledge that is fatal and too sure” 
(quoted in Deleuze, Pure Immanence, 59), affirming Salomé’s provocative thesis that 
Nietzsche’s “madness” is not irrespective of his thinking. This challenges 
Nietzsche’s own deployment of the mask of madness as that which covers truth. 
Said otherwise, madness is truth. Or, better yet, truth is madness: non-rational, 
non-a-priori, among other things.  Deleuze suggests instead that madness marks 
the moment when the masks “merge into a death-like rigidity,” “no longer 
shifting and communicating” (59). To say that Nietzsche didn’t believe in the 
unity of a self isn’t to say that he believed in irreconcilable parts, but rather that 
he worked through the division that would result in a dualism in the first place, 
ending the function of the mask as that itself which renders legible both exterior 
and interior, surface and depth.  
      The mask has a similar function as the Spielraum or pivot discussed earlier in 
reference to Salomé. The mask marks an outside from an inside, but it also marks 
a secondary outside from a secondary inside, creating a barrier between world and 
self. Functionally, too, it marks the body-form, the skin, as an inside in relation to 
which there exists a further inside. This suggests that the outside is already an 
inside, or that the world of “mere” appearances is itself already the inside—the 
folded-in-ness—of an outside. This preempts Deleuze’s thinking of the fold [le 
pli], which designates the fold-ing of forces that create distinctions between inside 
and outside. Deleuze’s position here is consistent with his thinking of the fold in 
other works, and is deeply indebted to Nietzsche.3 For Deleuze, forces give rise 
to processes of folding that create an inside-outside, which is an inside composed 
of its own outside (itself determined by outer forces). Deleuze tells us that the 
investigation of the external forces with which a human comes into contact is 																																																								
3 I am thinking here of the discussion of the fold especially in Foucault. 
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necessary to determine the form created within a given historical formation. The 
forces within a human can—depending on the forces with which they interlace—
give rise to forms other than what Deleuze calls the Man-form: the historical form-
ation marked by forces of finitude.4 The Man-form has itself been constituted 
only within the folds of finitude, meaning that it locates (or folds) death within 
the person. For Deleuze, the defining feature of classical thought is how it thinks 
the infinite; external forces are what can be raised to infinity (God, for instance). 
The human being would then be conceived as a mere limitation on infinity. 
Finitude is then derivative on infinitude: a derivative and not a primary force in 
itself. On this model, human understanding is merely the limitation placed on 
infinite understanding. Forces within the human being thus enter into a relation 
with forces that raise things to infinity, which result in limited, finite forces within 
the human being. This is why the human being (the Man-Form for Deleuze) is 
thematized as a fold, and why God, or the God-Form, is thematized as the unfold, 
understood as the unfolding of every force that can be raised to infinity.     
      Nietzsche’s proclamation that a style should live emphasizes life as that 
animating force ultimately undergirding his philosophy, especially his thinking of 
the overcoming of nihilism. The man who proclaims God’s death is also our 
greatest proponent of life. Deleuze says that “there is being only because there is 
life [...] the Experience of life is thus posited as the most general law of beings [...] 
but this ontology discloses not so much what gives beings their foundation as 
what bears them for an instant towards a precarious form” (129). That is, the 
Experience of life (this ontology) discloses not formal or universal conditions of 
possibility, but the relation between forces, which produces a certain historical 
formation (the God-form, Man-form, etc.). Each category reveals a particular 
relation between forces (129).5 As Deleuze points out, for Nietzsche, the Man-
form is what imprisons life within itself, and the superman is what frees it. (Deleuze, 
Foucault, 130). I take this to mean that Nietzsche’s Ubermensch inaugurates the 
freeing of the force of life from those forms which would maintain metaphysical 
dualisms. As Nietzsche puts it in the Genealogy, the ascetic is that contradiction of 
“life against life” which would also spring from the “protective and healing 
instincts of a degenerating life, which uses every means to maintain itself and 
struggles for its existence” (On the Genealogy of Morality, 87). This is the paradox of 
annihilation, and what both Nietzsche and Deleuze seem to recognize as the 
“force” of life which is present even in those who would seemingly enact its 																																																								
4 Forces of finitude themselves mean that humanity (?) exists only through the dissemination of 
the various methods for organizing life (such as the dispersion of languages) (130) 
5 “Of prime necessity is life: a style should live” (129)	
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denial. The understanding of life as a force which operates against itself is the 
folding of life which creates the Man-form.  
 
Conclusion 
If clothing is the mask of the body, then what the logic of Nietzsche’s 
mask reveals is that there is nothing underneath. This is not to suggest that there 
is an empty void or abyss beneath our second skins, but rather that what is found 
underneath is not itself a truer or more essential version of what might be seen 
on the outside. If costume does not lack “depth” on the grounds of this 
Nietzschean critique, then depth cannot be the reason which can continue to 
mark the philosophical exclusion of dress. As editors Ron Scapp and Brian Seitz 
say in their introduction to Fashion Statements: with Nietzsche, the “time-honored 
opposition between reality and appearance—a product of a confused fantasy—is 
readily exposed by fashion” (3).  
      The pursuit of the origin, as Foucault puts it in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History,” assumes “the existence of immobile forms that precede the external 
world of accident and succession” (371). As Foucault puts it, this necessitates the 
“removal of every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity” (371). But this 
removal of the mask is contra the project of genealogy. The genealogist finds 
nothing beyond the mask. The mask is not a mere metaphor here, but a material 
index of the genealogical method. The death of man, and the coming of the 
superman or Ubermensch, relies on the abolishment of the appearance-reality 
bifurcation, or the inside-outside distinction, as Deleuze’s thinking of the fold in 
part attempts to work through. And this death, as Foucault comforts, is not worth 
crying over (Deleuze, Foucault, 130). In response to Luce Irigaray’s question of 
whether or not there can be a Nietzsche unmasked, the answer is, simply, no. 
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